Set-valued database publication has been attracting much attention due to its benefit for various applications like recommendation systems and marketing analysis. However, publishing original database directly is risky since an unauthorized party may violate individual privacy by associating and analyzing relations between individuals and set of items in the published database, which is known as identity linkage attack. Generally, an attack is performed based on attacker's background knowledge obtained by a prior investigation and such adversary knowledge should be taken into account in the data anonymization. Various data anonymization schemes have been proposed to prevent the identity linkage attack. However, in existing data anonymization schemes, either data utility or data property is reduced a lot after excessive database modification and consequently data recipients become to distrust the released database.
INTRODUCTION
Publishing a set-valued database such as those containing web click log, customer transaction and trajectory data allows one to analyze its data and is beneficial for the public. An unsolved problem of publishing database to the public is that sensitive information such as personal private preference can be linked to a specific individual. Therefore, an action such as data modification to achieve data anonymity should be taken before publishing the database. Pseudonym is one simple way to protect the data. It alters certain attributes such as name or personal identification number into pseudonym to create anonymous data. This techniques have been proved insecure since an adversary can commit identity linkage attack [13] by comparing some attributes in the released database with those in other publicly available databases such as voter lists and associating a record with a specific individual. Performing data modification to achieve maximum anonymity with keeping data utility known to be NP-hard problem [16, 18] .
From the last decade, many algorithms have been proposed to deal with problems in data anonymization. Since the problems of data anonymization are complex, each solution has its trade-off between data privacy and data utility. Generalization and suppression are frequently employed techniques to obtain data anonymity but for example employing generalization technique such as full domain generalization in database [12, 15, 19, 21] leads significant information loss although it guarantees privacy preservation. Information loss means the number of information that is reduced due to data modification.
Most of the previous studies in privacy preserving data publishing concern in relational databases. This type of databases have several attributes such as identity attribute, quasi-identifier attribute and sensitive attribute. Unlike relational database, set-valued database is a type of database consisting of tuples which have a logical form TID, UID and IID without emphasizing about the detail of how the data is stored [10] , where TID means tuple id while UID and IID refer to user id and a set of items id, respectively. Thus, each person in a tuple is directly associated with a set of items. Note that tuple is also called record and we use record and tuple interchangeably.
Records or tuples in set-valued database may contain different number of items and if we consider each item as a quasiidentifier like in relational database, then it will have very high dimensionality [14] . As a result, applying k-anonymity will not be effective due to the curse of high dimensionality in set-valued database [1] . Another important aspect that is less considered in data anonymization is database properties, such as database size and item length in each tuple. Those properties refer to the number of records in database and the number of items in each record respectively.
In this paper, we propose an approach called sibling replacement to generate anonymized database which protects set-valued database from identity linkage attack with maintaining data utility and data property. The proposed approach is totally different from generalization and suppression and adopts distortion based technique where value replacement is employed. In addition, it consists of two important steps, the first is grouping the records based on adversary knowledge and the second is selecting surrogate item to replace items in adversary knowledge. The surrogate item means the selected item from the same category of the items in adversary knowledge based on hierarchical generalization tree, refer to the example in Figure 1 .
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains a preliminaries work. Section 3 describes the method of our scheme, while experimental results are reported in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes this work as well as gives brief direction for further research.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Problem formulation
Let D be a set-valued database containing |D | tuples. Each tuple t ∈ D contains tuple id TID, user id UID and a set IID of item id's appearing in D. Since UID is removed before data publication, t only consists of TID and IID. For any tuple t, IID is not an empty set. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , .., i k , .., i N } be a set of all possible item id's. IID i is a set of item id's of t i .
An adversary tries to perform identity linkage attack to the database D. We assume that an adversary has prior knowledge about some of t ∈ D(refer to the next subsection for the the detail of adversary knowledge). In order to prevent the identity linkage attack we need to eliminate adversary knowledge from D, however, we should also keep minimum data utility lost and maintain data property. Definition 2.1. A database D is said to be strong against the identity linkage attack if no adversary with partial knowledge from I about up to m itemsets can successfully identify the record owner of any t ∈ D. Definition 2.2. A data anonymization scheme maintaining data utility and data property is a data anonymization scheme which given a database D, generates an anonymized databaseD strong against the identity linkage attack where the data utility lost inD is kept minimum and the data property ofD is as the same as that of D.
Example of problem
Consider a database D in Table 1 is released to a data mining company for analyzing user web access. Each URL is considered as an item. To simplify the discussion, URLs are expressed by numbers 1,2,3,..,12 in Table 1 . Items in each record are associated with individuals and can be used to re-identify record owner if an adversary has background knowledge generated from a prior investigation. Bob working in data mining company realizes that the database contains his friends' data. Since Bob knows that recently Alice just posted her leisure photos on faceme.com (i 2 ) as well as wrote her holiday activities in morningnews.com (i 8 ) and Mat just posted his nice holiday's pictures in meetme.com (i 5 ). Given such background knowledge, Bob can perform identity linkage attack to Alice's record t 2 with success probability around 33% since 3 out of 10 tuples, t 1 , t 2 and t 6 , contain both i 2 and i 8 .
To thwart such threat, we should perform data anonymization to reduce success probability of identity linkage attack by replacing items in adversary knowledge with its surrogate item, where the surrogate item is an item belonging to the same category of the items in adversary knowledge.
Privacy requirement Privacy protection concept
Data owner wants to release anonymized set-valued databaseD from D to other parties, e.g. data mining company. Identity linkage attack should not be successfully performed inD. The attack can be conducted if an adversary has adversary knowledge AK on msets of items in the database which is normally derived from some surveys or investigations prior to attacking the target. Set-valued database is said to guarantee privacy if the success probability that attacker associates records with individuals in anonymized databaseD is lower than that in original database D. In addition, at the same time there is no violated record, which means there is no record that newly contains adversary knowledge by data anonymization. Let us denote the success probability of attack in original database D as P(SuccAttack(D)) and that in anonymized database P(SuccAttack(D)). The number of records containing adversary knowledge is reduced by replacing items in the records with other items not contained in adversary knowledge, as a result the success probability P(SuccAttack(D)) of the attack after performing data anonymization will be lower than that of original database. 
Adversary knowledge
Considering the idea from [30] , it is essential to assume that adversary may know certain sets of items in a database to attack the targeted victim. It is further assumed in [30] that adversary has unbounded background knowledge and knows both sensitive and non-sensitive items in database. There is a critique [14] that this further assumption is unrealistic since set-valued data has arbitrary items in its records. k m -anonymity [22] assumed that adversary has knowledge about up to m items from a specific record in the database. Even such an adversary cannot distinguish the record from a set of k published database. In this paper we consider a candidate set AK of adversary knowledge such that AK = {AK 1 , AK 2 , .., AK a , .., AK m } and make an assumption that an adversary obtain only one set AK a as his background knowledge. Each AK a ∈ AK contains a set of items i k from I , where AK a = {i 1 , i 2 , .., i k , .., i n }. Each AK a allows the adversary to identify owner of record containing AK a with a certain success probability. Even though adversary knows a candidate set of owners corresponding to AK a we omit to express it.
Information loss and dissimilarity
The problem in data anonymization is not only guaranteeing data anonymity but also data utility after the anonymization process. There are several proposed measurement metrics to quantify data utility. In this paper we use Normalized Certainty Penalty [28] to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. We also measure the dissimilarity value between original database and anonymized database using dissimilarity metric [17] .
where u i is a generalization node representing item category in hierarchical category tree and generalizes all the items under the node. The notation |u i | indicates the number of leaves under a generalization node u i . |I | refers to the number of leaves in entire hierarchical generalization tree. The NCP value of item i spans from 0 to 1, NCP(i) is 0 if there is only one leave under the generalization node u i . Assume that the occurrences of item i in database is C i , to calculate the total NCP in a database we sum up the multiplication of NCP(i) to the C i and the sum is divided by the summation of C i in the database.
Dissimilarity metric (Diss) measures the difference of data histogram between original and anonymized databases, where f D and fD represent the number of occurrences of item i in original database and that in anonymized database respectively, while d and d are the total number of distinct items in D andD, respectively.
Related Work
Several prior studies for data anonymization with certain settings and assumptions have been proposed by employing generalization and suppression. Generalization technique refers to altering original value in data attributes with more general value to obtain anonymous database. On the other hand, suppression technique tries to remove some items or records from database in order to achieve data anonymity [4] . The authors of [25, 27] introduced guarding node scheme based on generalization technique to protect sensitive values. For example, gastric ulcer is guarded with stomach disease and pneumonia is guarded with respiratory infection. This scheme successfully reduces the success probability that of an adversary performs identity linkage attack. Unfortunately, this type of solution reduces data size significantly for set-valued database especially when there are several items with the same category in one record. Sibling generalization scheme is proposed in [12] in order to achieve data anonymity. However, this scheme results in unnatural data since specific values are mixed with general value. Other research [26, 28] proposed the idea of cell generalization scheme with employing local recoding. These approaches result in less data distortion and it reduces data utility, but unfortunately flexibility leads data exploration problem [8] . Therefore, we argue that implementing generalization and suppression schemes to obtain anonymized set-valued database is more likely not suitable for maintaining data utility as well as data property since data properties such as the number of items, item length and the number of records reduce significantly. Still we stress that it is important to maintain those properties in order to avoid disbelief from data recipients.
There are several works that have contributed to set-valued data anonymization [5, 10, 31] . However, those work used either generalization or suppression, and combination of both of them to obtain anonymized database. Table 7 and 8 show the properties and features of several prior work and our proposed method in set-valued data anonymization. An anonymization scheme based on suppression technique is proposed in [29] which assumes that adversary knows a certain number of items (p) for each transaction and removes the itemset that appears below the specified k value. ρ-uncertainty proposed in [11] utilizes partial suppression based on heuristic approach which removes only items in sensitive association rules to avoid excessive information loss. By improving the previous work, a scheme in [5] combining local generalization and partial suppression considers the sensitivity degree of each item as the parameter value to generate anonymized database. As a trajectory data anonymization, (K, C) L -privacy is proposed in [6] based on local suppression method which removes sequential trajectory that violates the privacy based on the given K, C and L values. Applying suppression technique successfully minimizes information loss. Unfortunately, it causes significant reduction with respect to database size and the length of records which may raise disbelief to the data recipients.
As an alternative of generalization and suppression schemes, we adopt the idea from blocking based technique [20] which is also successfully implemented in privacy preserving data mining area [3] [24] to anonymize set-valued databases. The blocking based technique does not discard or insert additional items in a tuple; instead, it replaces sensitive items with unknown value, commonly using question mark "?" or asterisk " * ". As a result, an adversary finds it difficult to reveal the real value [23] . In this research, we do not use question mark "?" to replace items in adversary knowledge since we want to keep the anonymized database in its natural format. Thus, we use surrogate item which comes from the same category of items in adversary knowledge to generate anonymized database.
DATA ANONYMIZATION PROCESS
Before explaining proposed data anonymization process, we provide some key terms of our proposal.
Victim item
Victim item vi a,k is an item i k ∈ AK a and is replaced with other item to eliminate adversary knowledge in D. To generate an anonymized database we do not replace all the items in AK a , and replace selected items i k ∈ AK a , which results in minimum dissimilarity to avoid to make excessive difference between D and D.
Surrogate item
In existing data anonymization methods no method that replaces items with another items. In this paper we introduce an new approach that uses item replacement to generate an anonymized database. The replacement of vi a,k should not be done arbitrarily since it may either reduce data utility due to a lot of information lost or disrupt data property by the replacement with items already existing in the record. Therefore, selecting an appropriate item, surrogate item, for the replacement of vi a,k should be carefully selected with respect to data utility and data property. To this end user needs to create a hierarchical tree with depth 2 to categorize items in database. The leaves of the tree are items and the intermediate nodes are categories of items. The most general category is assigned to the root. An example of the hierarchical tree is shown in Figure 1 . To derive a surrogate item si a,k for replacing vi a,k , we need to list all the siblings of vi a,k in the same category of the hierarchical tree to create a candidate surrogate item list, CS a,k . After creating the list we select si a,k among items in CS a,k .
Proposed method: Sibling replacement
The proposed method, sibling replacement, consists of two main steps to achieve a desirable anonymous database. At first, we group tuples with the same adversary knowledge AK a into one group. Second, we select a surrogate item for each item i k ∈ AK a which has the same category with i k ∈ AK a .
Record grouping
Before performing data anonymization database D is split into multiple groups G a 's of tuples. To group the tuples, scan all the tuples t i ∈ D to check whether the IID i contains any AK a ∈ AK = {AK 1 , AK 2 , .., AK a , .., AK m }. The AK a can be used to form a group G a of tuples. For example in Table 1 , given AK 1 = {i 2 , i 8 }, G 1 = {t 1 , t 2 , t 6 }. In our proposed algorithm there is no intersection among these groups since the t i is checked based on the order of AK a . For a = 1 to m, check whether AK a ⊆ IID i is satisfied, if it is true then add t i to G a . On the other hand, the rest of the tuples not containing any AK a is grouped as G r . Tuples of this group are not processed in D for data anonymization. The aims of grouping the tuples is to avoid any miss replacement of the tuples not containing any AK a . Moreover, the grouping offers benefit to reduce computational time, specifically if we have multiple servers so that each group of records could be sent to each server for data anonymization process. Algorithm 1 presents a grouping method.
Algorithm 1: Grouping record
INPUT : D, AK ; // AK = AK 1 ,..,AK a ,..,AK m OUTPUT : G 1 , G 2 , .., G a , ..G m and G r ; // D = G 1 ∪ G 2 ... ∪ G m ∪ G r Read D; forall t i ∈ D do forall a = 1 to m do if AK a ⊆ IID i then append t i to G a ; end end append t i to G r ; end
Requisites of surrogate item: Violated record and Item loss
There are some strict requisites for items in CS a,k to be selected as si a,k . The aims of those requisites is to ensure the P(SuccAttack(D)) is lower than P(SuccAttack(D)) and the data utility as well as data properties in theD is not too much different from that of D. Firstly, si a,k should not result in violated records. Even though some of records in D contain adversary knowledge AK a , the replacement removes some items of AK a from the record so that identity linkage attack can no longer be performed. Still the replacement may induce other adversary knowledge AK ′ a in the records and the attack can be launched with use of AK ′ a . Violated records, i.e. records newly containing such adversary knowledge after the data anonymization, should not be generated. The number of violated records caused by item i ∈ CS a,k is denoted by V R(i). An item i ∈ CS a,k resulting in violated records will be penalized by adding one point to V R(i) for each of violated records. That is, we straightforwardly count the number of records which newly contain adversary knowledge AK ′ a by the replacement of i k ∈ AK a ∈ G a with i ∈ CS a,k . An item in CS a,k with the smallest V R(i) is selected as surrogate item si a,k because it causes the minimum number of violated records. Secondly, si a,k should minimize the number of items lost in theD after the replacement, denoted as IL(i). The value of IL(i) from each candidate surrogate item i ∈ CS a,k can be computed by checking the simultaneous occurrences of both i ∈ G a and vi a,k in tuples of G a , and we count one for IL(i) if both items exist in the same tuple. Thus, any item in CS a,k which satisfies the requisites will be selected as si a,k to replace vi a,k .
Item selection and replacement
Once the groups G a 's are created, the next step is performing data anonymization for each G a which is a partition of D. To generate an anonymized group G a we just need to eliminate all i k ∈ AK a in t i ∈ D satisfying t i ∈ G a . To this end, we load each G a then inspect each item i k ∈ AK a and replace it with its surrogate item si a,k . The surrogate item selection process is performed by checking through all the candidate surrogate items in CS a,k . There are two requirements that should be convinced by each item in CS a,k to be selected as the surrogate item si a,k . The first is that candidate surrogate item i ∈ CS a,k should result in the minimum number V R(i) of violated record and the second is that it should cause the least side effect with respect to the number IL(i) of items lost by the replacement. A candidate surrogate item in CS a,k with the minimum (V R(i) + IL(i)) is determined to be the surrogate item.
Once the group anonymization process has been completed, the next procedure is combining all the groups G a and G r into one anonymized databaseD. Algorithm 2 represents the procedure of group anonymiazation.
Data truthfulness
Unavoidable side effect of performing any data anonymization is the appearance of false data due to the present or absent of items in tuples. We realize that the data accuracy has an important role to support decision making. This can be discussed in other place indicating that the proposed scheme can be applied to such a situation. Prior to data modification, the probability of a user to get false data is 0. However, after data anonymization process the probability is no longer 0, instead it depends on the total number of modified tuples inD. The probability that one gets certain number of true record T t and false records T f can be measured as follows,
where |M r | is the number of modified records. Then probability to get T t is
Algorithm 2: Group anonymization by item selection and replacement
Create list CS a,k by adding i having the same category with vi a,k to CS a,k ; foreach i ∈ CS a,k do Count the V R(i) and IL(i);
end Replace vi a,k with si a,k ; end end Since the algorithm uses item substitution approach to achieve data anonymity, unavoidable side effect such as false records t n ∈D may exist due to the present and absent of item i k from the records. Thus, we have to carefully apply the algorithm, specifically in health database or medical database where false records are not desirable.
Example
Refer to Section 2.2 the example of problem and associated Table 1 . In the example, adversary has m = 2, AK 1 ={2,8} and AK 2 ={5}. Thus, the tuples in Table 1 can be grouped into 2 groups G 1 and G 2 . In group G 1 , there are two victim items i.e vi 1,2 ={2} and vi 1,8 ={8}, while G 2 only contains one victim item vi 2,5 ={5}. Due to space limitation, in this example we only show the anonymization process for G 1 . Now, based on Figure 1 Hierarchical generalization tree we create a list of candidate surrogate items CS a,k for each vi a,k . The CS a,k of vi 1,8 is item id {3,9}, while CS a,k of vi 1,2 is item id {1,5}. Following that, we count the number of V R(i) and IL(i) from each candidate surrogate item CS a,k . We find that if we replace item id '2' with item id '1', it results V R(1) = 0 and IL(1) = 1; meanwhile, if we replace item id '2' with item id '5' it results V R(5) = 2 and IL(5) = 0. In this case, we select item id '1' as the surrogate item of item id '2' since it gives min(V R(i) + IL(i)). After finishing group anonymization the last step is merging all G a with G r .
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we conduct several extensive experiments using real database BMS-W ebV iew2 2 6 9 12 t 10 1 2 3 9 10 that contains 3,340 distinct items with 77,512 records and average length is 5 items. The data set is commonly used as the benchmark in knowledge discovery group. Following the idea of [10] , we create an artificial hierarchy tree with 50 categories and each category has equally likely number of items selected from D. All the algorithms are implemented in JAVA. To evaluate the result, we utilize NCP metric to measure information loss and we use dissimilarity metric to measure the difference between original database and anonymized database. We also measure data utility for data mining tasks by counting the number of frequent itemset and rules from the anonymized database with our method and compare that of original database.
Success probability of attack
To confirm our proposed method, we measure the success probability of the attacker. In this experiment, we randomly generate 10 itemsets from I as adversary knowledge with the length of the itemsets between 2 and 4. By using the adversary knowledge, we execute our data anonymization algorithm and found that there are 1,312 tuples contain AK. After running the algorithm, it is found that no AK a exists inD. Thus, the P(SuccAttack(D)) is 0. Our method can guarantee that success probability of attack in anonymized database is 0%.
Information loss and dissimilarity
Based on the experiments, we can see in Table 5 that our proposed algorithm results in smaller information loss and dissimilarity compared with that of global generalization. It successfully reduces the information loss up to ten times lower than that of global generalization. In addition, we can achieve zero dissimilarity value, which means our method preserves data properies of the anonymized database as the same as that of original database. This is because items of the hierarchical tree selected only from items belonging to D
Data utility for data mining tasks
To proof the data utility of our scheme, we conduct several comparisons among original database, anonymized database with our proposed sibling replacement and anonymized database with global generalization in terms of the number of frequent itemset and rules. We run data mining task such as frequent itemset mining using FP-Growth algorithm [9] and association rule mining using appriori algorithm [2] with spm f software [7] over those three databases. We also use several minimum support threshold (minSupp) ranging from 0.01 to 0.02 and minimum confident (minCon f ) value is 0.01 to generate frequent itemsets and rules for those mining tasks. Results from Figure 2 , 3 and Figure 4 show that the number of frequent itemsets and rules from anonymized database with sibling replacement is slightly lower than that of original database. However, it does not result in artificial frequent itemset and rules. Meanwhile, anonymized database with generalization scheme results in more frequent itemsets and rules but it contains many artificial frequent itemsets and rules compared with that of original database.
Data truthfulness
We measure the data truthfulness for anonymized database based on the equation (4) and (5) . In this experiment, we found that 1,312 tuples contain AK and those are modified to achieve anonymized database. Therefore, the probability of data recipient gets true data and false data are 0.984 and 0.016, respectively.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a data anonymization scheme maintaining data utility and data property called sibling replacement which follows blocking based approach. Unlike other existing data anonymization schemes using generalization or suppression, it uses item replacement to generate anonymized database. The proposed scheme has two main stages to generate anonymized database such as records grouping, and item selection and item replacement. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme provides lower information loss and preserves data properties as the same as that of original database. Remarkably, it does not reduce the total number of items in database (zero dissimilarity). Another advantages of this proposed algorithm is that it preserves considerable data utility for specific data mining tasks.
Item selection and replacement is the most crucial part in our anonymization scheme since it defines the quality of anonymized database. Therefore, in the future it is important to examine other selection techniques along with its criteria to have better quality of anonymized database. Another important point is modeling of adversary knowledge. Unlike possession of one adversary knowledge, adversary may perform a more elaborated attack using multiple adversary knowledge. The success probability of identity linkage attack should be also evaluated under such an adversary modeling.
